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Abstract
Are newly established institutions capable of shaping actors’ strategies and coordinating 
behavior on a single path? Contrary to punctuated equilibrium analyses, this paper sug-
gests that the constraining capacity of a range of newly established institutions in new 
European capitalisms is weak and that their very interpretation is subject to contention. 
Focusing on peak-level tripartism – a formally similar institution whose functioning 
has varied across national contexts – this paper proposes an actor-centered framework 
to elucidate the logic and consequences of actors’ ongoing strategic maneuvering for the 
interpretation, enactment, and development of these young institutions. Combining 
insights of rational choice and historical institutionalism, the paper develops a heuristic 
model which, by focusing on strategic choices of government offi cials and union lea-
ders, links the varied enactment of tripartism to different power balances that become 
mutually accepted in the course of their repeated interactions. In offering a set of falsi-
fi able propositions, the paper provides a guideline for building analytical narratives to 
evaluate empirically this model.
Zusammenfassung
Sind neu geschaffene Institutionen in der Lage, Akteurstrategien zu determinieren? Der 
Ansatz dieses Discussion Papers steht im Gegensatz zu „Punctuated-Equilibrium“-An-
sätzen. Es wird argumentiert, dass in den neuen osteuropäischen Marktwirtschaften 
der Einfl uss einiger neu geschaffener Institutionen schwach und ihre Interpretation 
strittig ist. Im Fokus der Betrachtung steht dabei der Tripartismus auf zentraler Ebene 
– eine Institution, die in verschiedenen nationalen Kontexten unterschiedliche Funk-
tionen entwickelt hat. Von einem akteurzentrierten Ansatz aus werden Logik und 
Konsequenzen des permanenten strategischen Manövrierens der Akteure für die In-
terpretation, Inkraftsetzung und Entwicklung dieser jungen Institutionen untersucht. 
Das Paper kombiniert Erkenntnisse des „Rational-Choice“-Institutionalismus und des 
historischen Institutionalismus und entwickelt daraus ein heuristisches Modell, das 
– durch Fokussierung auf die strategischen Entscheidungen von Regierungsbeamten 
und Gewerkschaftsführern – die unterschiedlichen Inkraftsetzungen des Tripartismus 
mit unterschiedlichen Kräfteverhältnissen in Verbindung setzt. Diese wiederum werden 
im Zuge ihrer wiederholten Interaktionen gegenseitig anerkannt. Das Paper stellt eine 
Reihe falsifi zierbarer Hypothesen auf, die Anhaltspunkte für „Analytical Narratives“ 
bieten, anhand derer das Modell empirisch bewertet werden kann.
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Introduction
One of the largest institution-building projects in history took place in a surprisingly 
short period of time. The early 1990s witnessed the wholesale replacement, or at the 
very least a thorough adaptation, of economic and political institutions across post-
communist Europe. As a result, scholarly attention has focused on explaining particular 
institutional choices that individual countries made following the collapse of commu-
nism. Given the magnitude of institutional transformation and the short time in which 
the main pillars of the new system were constructed, it is not surprising that much of 
this research has been dominated by analyses inspired by the punctuated equilibrium 
model of institutional change (Gould 1982). Featuring the idea of temporal path de-
pendence (see Collier/Collier 1991; Krasner 1988; Mahoney 2000), such analyses com-
monly distinguish between two periods with an alternating infl uence of agency and 
structure. Actors’ choices are thought to be particularly important during the period 
of critical junctures, such as those of extraordinary politics that characterize the onset 
of regime transitions. But once the choices about formal institutions are made, the im-
portance of agency seems to diminish as behavior is expected to become increasingly 
governed by constraints and incentives provided by new institutions.
In focusing on choices made during the critical juncture, this type of analysis has there-
fore largely neglected a number of important questions related to the subsequent devel-
opment of these newly established institutions: What happens to new institutions once 
the initial period of extraordinary politics and “mega-change” is over? Are they capable 
of shaping actors’ strategies and policy choices or, alternatively, is their constraining 
capacity weak and their very interpretation subject to further contention? If the latter 
is the case, what determines the size of the gap between formal institutional rules and 
their interpretation and enactment in practice? In short, what mechanisms drive the 
development of young institutions in systems undergoing uncertain change?
These questions are particularly pertinent to a range of regulative political-economic 
institutions whose degree of self-reinforcement is unlikely to be as strong as that of 
constitutive rules and, in particular, of formal political institutions.1 Given the novelty 
of many regulative institutional arrangements, and often the simultaneous absence of 
signifi cant penalties for non-compliance with their rules, the outcomes of such insti-
tutions cannot be simply read off their formal parameters. Indeed, as ample examples 
from these new capitalisms demonstrate, the functioning of various regulatory institu-
tions has often differed considerably from their formal requirements. This has been 
particularly clear in the sphere of industrial relations, where the functioning of largely 
This paper draws on Chapter 2 of my book manuscript entitled “Power Perceptions and Institu-
tional Development: Government–Union Interactions in Post-Communism.” I am grateful to Colin 
Crouch, Wolfgang Streeck, Patrik Aspers and Cornelia Woll for constructive criticism and valuable 
suggestions. 
1 On the distinction between regulative and constitutive institutions, see Searle (1995) and Alex-
ander (2004). 
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similar peak-level tripartite arrangements for centralized bargaining and policy consul-
tation has varied considerably across countries. In some cases, these corporatist-type 
structures have assumed an important role in policymaking and generated comprehen-
sive agreements facilitating economic adjustment and spanning multiple policy areas. 
In other cases, however, these formal structures have remained at the margins of policy-
making, failing to infl uence signifi cantly both the shape of broader economic reforms 
and more specifi c industrial relations issues.
This evident gap between, on the one hand, formally similar institutional arrangements 
and, on the other, their enactment across countries has two broader implications. First, 
it cautions against a superfi cial categorization of these political economies according to 
their formal institutional architecture and calls instead for discerning the dynamics of 
the post-design development of newly established institutions. For it is the way in which 
these institutions are practiced, rather than their formal parameters, that reveals more 
about the types of these new capitalisms. Second – and central to this paper – this gap 
also indicates that the capacity of newly established institutions to constrain behavior 
and generate credible commitments to particular outcomes might not be suffi ciently 
strong. This, in turn, suggests that our analysis of institutional development in these 
new capitalisms needs to rest on conceptual pillars that allow for a more extensive role 
of agency in the post-design period than traditional punctuated equilibrium analysis 
does.
This paper goes one step in this direction. It suggests the basic pillars of an interactionist 
approach to institutional development in post-communism and then uses its logic to 
illuminate the process of development of peak-level tripartism, an institution tradition-
ally associated with a corporatist style of policymaking. I argue, however, that the formal 
establishment of the new institutions across postcommunist Europe did not determine 
a defi nite path of political processes, as rigid punctuated equilibrium arguments would 
have it. Rather, it opened a set of possible paths or patterns of interaction, the choice of 
which ultimately depended on actors’ ongoing perceptions of their relative power. This 
allowed similar formal requirements of these institutions to be interpreted and enacted 
differently, thus generating rather different outcomes across countries and over time.
Instead of demonstrating this argument empirically, this paper engages in a theory-
building exercise by suggesting a way of how to study and meaningfully compare the 
interactive processes that shape these new institutions of economic governance. To this 
end, I propose a heuristic model that specifi es the sources of perceptions of the relative 
power of the main actors, their impact on the choice of strategies, and the conditions 
under which the perceptions and thus the strategies will be altered. In distinguishing 
between union-favorable and union-adverse strategies of the government, and unions’ 
support or opposition to government reforms, I identify a range of institutional paths 
that can be shaped through a different sequencing of their strategic interplay. Refl ecting 
different degrees of power asymmetries that become mutually accepted in the course
Avdagic: One Path or Several? 7
of a repeated play, the resulting paths determine whether these corporatist-type struc-
tures become an essential part of policymaking or largely empty shells whose practical 
purpose is the mere dissemination of information, rather than genuine bargaining and 
policy deliberation.
The strategic model proposed in this paper emphasizes a common objective of govern-
ment offi cials and union leaders to maintain their power while pursuing their specifi c 
institutional and policy preferences. This emphasis serves two purposes. First, it allows 
us to derive a set of falsifi able propositions about actors’ strategies. In this way, the 
model lends itself to an explicit test that can be conducted by building analytical narra-
tives. Second, by differentiating between actors’ shared core objectives and their specifi c, 
contextually and historically defi ned institutional and policy preferences, this model il-
lustrates how insights of rational choice and historical institutionalism can be fruitfully 
combined to explain actors’ strategies and thus the varied development and functioning 
of formally similar corporatist-type institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two offers a brief description of the for-
mal functions and rules of postcommunist tripartism. Section three provides a criti-
cal review of accounts that examine the development of this institution by relying on 
the logic of punctuated equilibrium analysis. Section four sketches the main pillars of 
the interactionist approach to institutional development, thus providing a basis for the 
model of government–union interactions presented in the subsequent section. Section 
six provides a guideline for empirical evaluation of the model. Section seven concludes 
by recapitulating the argument and contrasting it with standard analyses that explain 
institutional outcomes in terms of the distribution of power.
Postcommunist tripartism: Extensive functions, ambiguous rules
Peak-level tripartite institutions were established in most countries of Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE) at the very onset of democratic and market transitions. Driven not 
only by the concern to preserve social peace during market transformations, but also by 
direct and indirect incentives provided by international organizations such as the In-
ternational Labor Organization and the European Commission, by the mid-1990s such 
forums had mushroomed across all postcommunist countries. Given the general weak-
ness of organized interests, the absence of collective bargaining arrangements at the 
sectoral level and of strong works councils at the enterprise level, these national-level 
corporatist-type forums were soon to become the central industrial relations institu-
tions in these new capitalisms. This form of social partnership was intended to promote 
coordination between, primarily, representatives of government and organized labor, 
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but also the slowly emerging employers’ organizations.2 In so doing, these institutions 
were to prevent confl ict and smoothen the process of comprehensive market transfor-
mation.
In formal terms, tripartism displays rather similar features across these new capital-
isms. In all of them this form of coordination has been formally institutionalized and 
peak-level tripartite bodies have a legal foundation. Judging by the statutes and laws 
governing these institutions, they have extensive formal functions. Their task is to facili-
tate peak-level negotiation and/or deliberation over wages, labor legislation, the terms 
of industrial restructuring, reforms to the social protection system, and more general 
economic and social policy. The latter includes issues ranging from the state budget to 
reform of the tax, pensions and health system. In general, the government is required to 
present all relevant legislative and policy proposals to discussion in the tripartite coun-
cil prior to submitting them to parliament.3
In theory, such institutions have the potential to generate mutually benefi cial policy 
solutions, ensure effi cient and equitable reforms, make incumbents more accountable, 
and turn labor unions into key stakeholders in the transformation process. In this sense, 
these formal institutions resemble what students of cooperation have labeled “con-
structed focal points,” denoting formal institutions that specify the rules of the game 
tailored to capture the gains of cooperation (Garrett/Weingast 1993). Commonly, such 
“constructed focal points” are thought to be particularly useful in cases where actors 
have divergent preferences regarding outcomes, such as the content and pace of market 
transformation.
Below, however, I contend that the potential of postcommunist tripartism to ensure 
such outcomes is problematic because its rules are neither internalized by actors nor 
suffi ciently precise to stipulate how the latter should behave in specifi c circumstances. 
This ambiguity, in turn, creates the possibility that non-adherence to even the most 
general rules of deliberation may go unpunished. The upshot of this, I argue, is that this 
regulative institution by itself is unlikely to generate the kind of behavior that would 
ensure coordination on a stable and mutually benefi cial path of cooperation. Lacking 
such capacity, this institution becomes open to interpretation and thus to different uses 
by actors trying to advance their particular objectives. The next section elaborates this 
2 In reality, postcommunist tripartism has been more of a bipartite affair between government 
and trade unions, at least up to the end of the 1990s. Notwithstanding dramatic decreases in 
union membership in all CEE countries, it is employers’ organizations that appeared to be the 
weakest and least organized partners in these institutions. Whereas initially this state of affairs 
refl ected the communist legacy of predominant state ownership, later on the situation mirrored 
the general lack of interest of a large portion of private employers in joining business organiza-
tions or entering into bargaining above the enterprise level.
3 There is by now an extensive literature on postcommunist tripartism. For general overviews of 
the functions of this institution, see for instance Casale (1999a), EIRO (2004a), Iankova (1998; 
2002), Kohl/Platzer (2004).
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argument in more detail by juxtaposing it with accounts of postcommunist tripartism 
which assume the potential of its rules to generate the expected behavior.
Causes or effects? Reconsidering the institutions–behavior link
Some of the most prominent accounts of institutional choices in post-communism (see 
Easter 1997; Karl/Schmitter 1991; Lijphart 1992; McFaul 2002; Munck/Leff 1997; Prze-
worski 1991) build on a punctuated equilibrium analysis. Typically, such analyses dis-
tinguish between critical junctures – as agency-dominated periods that give rise to new 
institutions – and the subsequent periods of institutional stasis or consolidation. The 
logic of the latter, while having received considerably less attention, is explained in two 
main ways. Those who draw on a voluntarist perspective expect the newly established 
institutions to stabilize because of either sunk costs or the coordination and learning 
effects that they generate. Analyses closer to a structural perspective, on the other hand, 
explain the stability and reproduction of the new institutions in terms of formal rules, 
norms or conventions that often refl ect particular historical legacies.4 These differences 
notwithstanding, a common belief is that institutions, once established, set lasting path-
ways of future political processes (see Elster 1993: 175; Lijphart 1992: 208). By changing 
actors’ incentive structures, institutions are expected to minimize the contingency of 
interactions and provide credible commitments to future policy outcomes. Institutions, 
in other words, are supposed to generate the sort of behavior and strategies that rein-
force their own stability.5 Guided by the premise that institutions produce stable pat-
terns of exchange, such analyses, therefore, generally consider neither the possibility of 
a substantial deviation from institutional rules nor their potential modifi cation in the 
absence of major exogenous shocks.
Much of the literature examining the development of the institution of postcommunist 
tripartism, while predominantly descriptive, implicitly follows this general logic. For in-
stance, several accounts seem to employ a broad voluntarist reasoning when attributing 
the institutionalization of tripartism to the particular benefi ts of coordination, whether 
that be social peace, sustainable economic reforms or political stability (Héthy 1995: 40; 
Iankova 1998; Ládo 1996: 167; Mansfeldová 1995: 61). Others seem to draw on struc-
tural reasoning when emphasizing the importance of procedures or the “institutional-
ization of compromise” underpinned by norms of cooperation and legacies of union 
4 The literature on critical junctures and path dependency is too extensive to be reviewed here. 
For some of the most comprehensive reviews of the concept and its application to the study of 
political-economic institutions, see Collier/Collier (1991); Mahoney (2000); Thelen (1999) and, 
in particular, Pierson (2000, 2004).
5 As elaborated by Greif and Laitin, such self-reinforcement denotes a process in which “more 
individuals in more situations would fi nd it best to adhere to the behavior associated with [a 
particular institution]” (2002: 33–34).
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participation (Iankova 2002: 9; Casale 1999a: 4, 14). Crucially, a good part of these stud-
ies relies on formal parameters of tripartism to derive conclusions about the resulting 
patterns of interaction or styles or policymaking. This line of reasoning has led some 
scholars to interpret the establishment of tripartite forums in CEE countries as a sign of 
the institutionalization of corporatist practices (Héthy 1994; Iankova 1998; Orenstein/
Hale 2001; Pedersen/Ronit/Hausner 1993). Similarly, others have used the structure or 
formal functions of tripartism as a platform from which to either gauge general effects 
of the new institutions (Casale 1999a) or categorize the type of these new capitalisms 
according to some well-established typologies (Ágh 1996: 243; Reutter 1996).
But while the assumption that formal rules stabilize interaction patterns by generating 
particular behavior might correspond well to the so-called “parchment institutions”, 
such as constitutions and electoral laws, the same is questionable for peak-level tri-
partism. The former are generally capable of constraining actors’ choices and creating 
“powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability” (Pierson 2004: 150). In con-
trast, the self-reinforcement of tripartism is neither automatic nor facilitated by factors 
that are thought to ensure institutional reproduction, such as large set-up costs or veto 
points. Moreover, the ambiguity of rules governing postcommunist tripartite exchange 
presents potential impediments to the reinforcement of this institution. While formal 
institutional rules require policy deliberation, they stipulate no legal penalties for non-
compliance with this principle.6 Given these characteristics, this regulative institutional 
arrangement is likely to be malleable and open to interpretation in the post-design pe-
riod.
Indeed, several accounts corroborate this argument empirically by revealing substantial 
variation in the enactment of these formally similar institutions across countries and 
over time (Avdagic 2005, 2006; Kohl/Platzer 2004; Seleny 1999; Stark/Bruszt 1998: chap. 
6). This variation is evident with respect to the policy content and regularity of tripar-
tite deliberations, their actual infl uence on the legislative and executive branch of the 
government, and the number and scope of agreements generated via these institutions. 
6 This non-binding character of postcommunist tripartism has led some scholars to portray 
this arrangement as a toothless institution, window dressing, and “illusory corporatism” (see 
Crowley 2004; Ost 2000; Tatur 1995). These studies argue that, given the historically weak labor 
unions and the imperatives of economic adjustment, the lack of binding contracts engenders 
unilateralism by the government rather than corporatism. These arguments rightly point at 
drawbacks of analyses that assume particular institutional effects on the basis of formal rules 
and procedures of tripartism. Yet, paradoxically, they make the same mistake, for they also as-
sume specifi c institutional effects (i.e. across-the-board government unilateralism), albeit on 
the basis of loopholes in the formal rules. Specifi cally, in emphasizing the universal weakness of 
organized labor, these studies fail to consider the capacity or power of the government. In doing 
so, they make a highly problematic (and empirically inaccurate) assumption that hedging and 
avoiding tripartite exchange is always without cost to the government. By unpacking the politi-
cal dynamics of government–union interactions and paying more attention to their perceptions 
of relative power over time, this paper will show that government unilateralism is but one pos-
sible outcome of this exchange.
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Agreements reached in these forums ranged from narrow issues such as minimum wag-
es to comprehensive social pacts facilitating adjustment and spanning multiple policy 
areas. Consequently, the practical role of these institutions and the degree to which they 
have facilitated the inclusion of organized labor in the overall reform process has varied 
signifi cantly across Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, evidently, the capacity of these 
institutions to shape strategies and ensure stable exchange has been rather weak. Instead 
of offering stable platforms for governing these young capitalisms, tripartite institu-
tions themselves have often been subject to practical modifi cation, while sometimes 
their very formal existence has been challenged.
Accounts relying on the punctuated equilibrium logic are incapable of explaining these 
developments. Because they treat institutions as a dependent variable at moments of 
critical juncture when new institutions are designed, and as an independent variable in 
the post-design period (see Krasner 1984: 240), such analyses commonly assume that 
new formal rules are capable of constraining behavior and generating predictable pat-
terns of interaction (see also Carey 2000). In making this assumption, they overlook 
the possibility that young institutions might in fact be effects rather than causes of par-
ticular behavior (see also Alexander 2001). As the evident variation in the functioning 
of the formally similar tripartite institutions in postcommunist countries suggests, we 
might be well advised to shift the focus from the dominant analytical question of how 
formal institutions determine strategies and produce stable interaction patterns to the 
question of how actors’ ongoing strategic maneuvering shapes the very meaning and 
functioning of newly established institutions.
This latter question has been central to a number of recent analyses concerned with 
gradual institutional change in advanced capitalisms (Crouch 2005; Crouch/Farrell 
2004; Deeg 2005; Streeck/Thelen 2005a). Critical of the determinism inherent in the 
literature drawing on the punctuated equilibrium model, this new line of work calls for 
interactionist models aimed at a better conceptualization of the role of actors not only 
in the creation but also in the reproduction and practical modifi cation of institutional 
arrangements. Institutions, in this view, are being continuously adjusted and modifi ed 
by (boundedly) rational actors with different interests and power. Central to this litera-
ture is a concern with how actors interpret and use institutions so that they can generate 
different logics of action.
Even though relevant, this concern has received little attention in the scholarship on 
postcommunist political economies. This is all the more surprising given that young 
institutions in particular cannot be taken for granted since their meaning in practice, 
as Streeck and Thelen put it, requires elaboration through a sequence of strategic deci-
sions (Streeck/Thelen 2005b: 30). It is precisely for this reason that theory-building on 
institutional development in these new capitalisms needs to rest on conceptual pillars 
that explicitly incorporate a more extensive role of strategic action in the post-design 
period. In the remainder of this paper, I contribute to this agenda by suggesting an 
actor-centered framework tailored to offer an analytical explanation of cross-country 
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variation in the development and functioning of formally similar peak-level corporat-
ist-type institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.
The four pillars of an interactionist approach
An interactionist approach attempts to capture the logic of ongoing strategic interac-
tions and their consequences for institutional development. In particular, the approach 
outlined here is concerned with examining how the interactions that occur during mar-
ket-building processes shape the development of newly created institutions that are to 
govern young market economies and structure regularized patterns of exchange.7 The 
explication of the mechanism that drives the course of action in such situations requires 
four fundamental conceptual pillars.
The fi rst pillar of the approach concerns the interplay between the structural context 
and strategic action in the process of institutional development. The structural con-
text consists of two temporally defi ned parts. The fi rst part refers to historical lega-
cies, understood as a set of institutional, social, economic, and cultural characteristics 
that a given society inherits through the course of its development. With the transition 
to capitalism, this inheritance does not simply vanish. Instead, the historical context 
remains important in that it infl uences the initial constellation of actors, their goals 
and identities, and often the way in which they go about constructing the new social 
order. The second part of the structural context refers to the present structures, such as 
the organizational confi guration of collective actors and the newly created institutional 
framework within which they operate. These arrangements defi ne actors’ resources or 
capabilities and provide rules intended to structure social action. However, neither the 
legacies nor the present structures alone fully determine actors’ strategies. The impact 
of legacies weakens with time as actors react to the changing environment and adapt 
their strategies to new circumstances. At the same time, the constraining property of 
newly created institutions is not strong enough to produce predictable patterns of be-
havior and modes of interaction. In contrast to more established institutional settings 
(see, for instance, Scharpf 1997), the transitional context is characterized by less stable 
actor constellations and more malleable institutional structures. Such a situation allows 
a greater degree of freedom for actors to shape and modify the newly created institu-
tions within which they act.
The second pillar of the interactionist approach relates to actors’ preferences. To explicate 
the mechanism of interaction, it is necessary to distinguish between actors’ preferences 
7 In this sense, the proposed approach is problem-driven rather than method-driven. For the 
discussion of advantages of problem-driven approaches, see Green (1994), Levi (2002) and 
Scharpf (1997). 
Avdagic: One Path or Several? 13
over institutional and policy outcomes and their core objectives. The former refl ect ac-
tors’ considerations about the relative desirability of corporatist-type deliberations and 
specifi c transformation policies. Such preferences are contextually and temporally de-
fi ned and are infl uenced by factors such as economic considerations, specifi c historical 
legacies, and actors’ values and ideological predispositions. As such, these preferences 
can vary not only across national contexts and over time but also among the same type 
of actors within the same context. For instance, union leaders might prefer different 
institutional and policy outcomes depending on whether they represent successor com-
munist unions or unions that arose in opposition to communism. This is so because 
the way in which actors experience the historical context has bearings on their identities 
and cognitive frames, and thus on their subsequent preferences regarding appropriate 
institutional solutions and the role of the state in the economy.8
Different institutional preferences notwithstanding, it is reasonable to assume that both 
government offi cials and union leaders have the same underlying interests or core ob-
jectives: they are both interested in maintaining (or augmenting) their power because 
otherwise they might not be able to attain their preferred institutional and policy out-
comes.9 This assumption is crucial for it identifi es the main mechanism of action and 
allows clear propositions about actors’ strategies to be derived and then verifi ed through 
empirical analysis. As a general rule, therefore, we should fi nd that when, in the course 
of interactions, actors perceive a change in the relative power, they will adjust their in-
stitutional and policy preferences in a way that is likely to have the most advantageous 
or least disadvantageous consequences for their core objectives.
The third pillar of this approach is focused on the relationship between actors’ ratio-
nality and the uncertainty of transitions. The complexity of simultaneous, large-scale 
economic and political transformations presents a formidable challenge to actors’ abil-
ity to make optimal decisions and follow gain-maximizing strategies. If rational action 
8 On the impact of norms and ideology on preference formation and change, see Levi (1998, 
2005) and Vanberg (2002). For labor politics studies that call for a synthesis of institutionalist 
and constructivist arguments in explaining actors’ strategies, see Hattam (1993), and Locke/
Thelen (1995). 
9 I am aware that, as any assumption about actors’ core objectives, this one is also disputable. 
Indeed, there is no general agreement on whether politicians’ core objectives are to secure of-
fi ce, policy, or votes (see, for instance, Müller/Strøm 1999), and whether they have short-term 
or long-term objectives. Similarly, the core objectives of union leaders might not be so clear-cut. 
For instance, they might be driven by ideological causes, have long-term objectives, or – espe-
cially when unions are encompassing – be interested in contributing to the overall economic 
effi ciency and “making the pie the society produces larger” (Olson 1982: 42). However, making 
a specifi c assumption about actors’ core objectives is necessary if one wants to derive empiri-
cally tractable propositions about their strategies and thus satisfy methodological concerns for 
parsimony. The assumption made in this paper, therefore, should be evaluated empirically. If 
empirical research reveals instances when government offi cials and union leaders refused to 
adjust their institutional and policy preferences despite the fact that pursuing such preferences 
presented a clear threat to their ability to maintain power, the proposed model would fi nd itself 
on shaky ground. 
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in general is impeded by the “murkiness” of social life (see, for instance, Fligstein 1999), 
then it would be even more problematic to assume the existence of perfectly rational 
decision-makers in the exceptionally murky environment of postcommunist transi-
tions. This is not to say that actors lack strategic acumen or that they act irrationally. On 
the contrary, actors seek to maximize their utility, but their ability to determine the op-
timal course of action is constrained by the uncertainty and fl uidity of the transitional 
context.10 Whereas under these constraints projecting the success of alternative courses 
of action is a daunting task, actors can and do make use of their refl exive properties 
(see also Emirbayer/Mische 1998; Hay/Wincott 1998; Simon 1998). Put simply, as the 
interactions proceed, actors rely on prior experience and accumulated knowledge when 
evaluating and adjusting their strategies to the exigencies of changing situations.
This discussion is directly related to the fourth and fi nal pillar of the interactionist ap-
proach, namely the link between power perceptions and decisionmaking under uncer-
tainty. When situational uncertainty is high, the actors’ ability to anticipate the response 
of others and to assign objective probabilities to alternative outcomes of interaction 
is limited. In more stable environments, the tendency is for institutions, trust, norms, 
and habits to serve as mechanisms that structure social interaction. In the transitional 
context, however, the potential of these mechanisms is signifi cantly lower for two prin-
cipal reasons. First, the newly established institutions typically do not constitute deep or 
stable equilibria (see Pierson 2004: chap. 5). This not only implies that such institutions 
might be more susceptible to modifi cation but also that their capacity to reinforce par-
ticular behavior is weaker at the early stages of their development.11 Second, the novelty 
of certain types of interaction, such as the corporatist-type exchange in post-commu-
nism, excludes the option of relying on either trust or established norms and practices 
to guide this process. Given the weakness of these mechanisms, actors’ choices in the 
uncertain context of transition are most likely to refl ect their perceptions of relative 
power (see also Luong 2002). Such perceptions offer clues about the likely responses of 
others and thus help actors estimate the probable utility of alternative strategies.
These four pillars constitute all the elements necessary to derive an exposition of the 
development and enactment of new regulative institutions in post-communism. In a 
nutshell, they suggest that context-specifi c historical and structural conditions shape 
10 This assertion evokes the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1957). Even though this con-
cept does not explicitly deal with situational uncertainty, it points to the limited cognitive ca-
pacity and computing ability of human agency. For a comprehensive review of the application 
of bounded rationality to several fi elds in political science, see Goodin (1999). The notion of 
bounded rationality fi gures most prominently in a number of organizational studies (see March 
1978, 1994; March/Olsen 1976), studies of political and governmental institutions (see Jones 
1999, 2001) and, in particular, economic sociology (see Beckert 1996, 2002). 
11 As Claus Offe has pointed out, institutions “must not only be known to exist, but ‘make sense’ 
to actors and even oblige them.” As long as actors lack a strong sense of loyalty to particular 
institutions, as is arguably the case with many newly created institutions in post-communism, 
they are unlikely to “submit to the obligations stipulated” (1996: 223). 
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actors’ institutional and policy preferences, while actors’ perceptions of their ability to 
attain such preferences without sacrifi cing their core objectives determine whether and 
how these preferences translate into strategic choices.
Interactions thus begin in a context where old formal rules and institutions have been 
scrapped overnight, while new ones are still not suffi ciently embedded to secure cred-
ible commitments or to oblige actors to conform to them. In such a context, the interac-
tion becomes a “game” in which interacting agents seek to push through their preferred 
view of economic transformation. Since the uncertainty erodes actors’ ability to assess 
relative power accurately, they need to choose their strategies based on subjective beliefs 
about what others can do. Specifi cally, intentionally rational actors are likely to make 
their choices by relying on two sets of available indicators of power. First, they are like-
ly to consider structural-organizational attributes, which in the case of government–
union interactions include indicators such as the electoral strength of the government 
or the concentration, encompassingness, and partisan ties of unions. Such attributes 
present resources that indicate actors’ potential capabilities and power. However, these 
attributes alone do not often provide a reliable or suffi cient basis for the assessment of 
power. This is particularly the case in the erratic context of the early transition, where 
actors, such as unions and political parties, undergo signifi cant internal reorganization 
and where their very confi guration is less stable. To arrive at a more complete estimate 
of each other’s capacity under such conditions, actors need to rely on additional behav-
ioral indicators of power, such as the observed internal dynamics.12 By combining these 
indicators, actors form their initial perceptions of relative power and decide on their 
strategies. As the interactions proceed, however, they regularly update their perceptions 
by evaluating the outcomes of previous actions, thus adjusting their strategies to new 
circumstances. In such an ongoing process, strategies chosen in individual rounds will, 
over time, shape an identifi able interaction pattern which is likely to govern future be-
havior and defi ne the very institutions within which these interactions proceed.13 What 
this pattern will eventually look like will depend on the specifi c balance of power that 
emerges through recurrent interactions between actors who are each trying to advance 
their specifi c institutional and policy preferences while securing their common core 
objectives.
12 By incorporating the internal dynamics as a key component for the assessment of power, my 
analysis departs from those that build on the power-resource approach, as elaborated by Korpi 
(1985, 2001). The latter generally neglects such indicators, relying heavily on structural attri-
butes of power (see Korpi 1985: 33, 2001: 244). The lack of attention to the internal dynamics, 
however, risks conceptualizing interacting collective agents, such as organized labor or indi-
vidual unions, as unitary in terms of institutional and policy preferences – an assumption that 
is problematic in the light of empirical evidence. Thus, while the framework proposed here con-
curs with the power-resource approach in that actors are intentionally rational and that their 
choices refl ect calculations about relative power, it suggests that such calculations are much 
more complex. The model presented later in this paper clarifi es in detail what such calculations 
entail for different actors. 
13 As Jack Knight has argued, if the past pattern of interaction is recognizable and distinctive, it is 
likely that actors will identify it as an institutionalized rule (1992: 79). 
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More generally, the approach outlined here exemplifi es how actors’ perceptions of rela-
tive power gradually reduce the contingency of action by structuring particular patterns 
of interaction which shape the very meaning and relevance of new regulative institu-
tions. The advantage of this approach is that it facilitates an analysis of the relationship 
between interactive processes and the development of institutions that is attentive to 
both general theory and the specifi cities of contexts. As such, the main pillars of this 
approach provide a useful guideline for a systematic analysis of the impact of recurring 
interactions between government offi cials and union leaders on the development of 
corporatist-type institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.
Below, I build on these pillars to propose a heuristic model of government–union in-
teractions. This model advances concrete propositions about how particular combina-
tions of institutional and behavioral factors infl uence actors’ perceptions of their rela-
tive power, their subsequent strategies, and the direction of development of formally 
similar tripartite institutions. I capture the dynamics of government–union interac-
tions as a continuum of strategic choices in consecutive time sequences. In this way, the 
model facilitates a systematic analysis of these interactions both across countries and 
over time.
Since my analysis concerns recurrent strategic interactions between actors who each 
seek to advance institutional and policy outcomes that serve their particular interests, 
the use of repeated non-cooperative games – especially in the extensive form – might 
seem intuitively useful. However, I choose to present government–union interactions 
in a non-formalized way because the specifi cs of the problem at hand suggest a limited 
value added of formal models. Two reasons in particular cast doubt on the potential of 
formal models for an analysis of the interactive processes that drive the development 
of postcommunist corporatist-type institutions. The fi rst reason concerns the widely 
accepted assertion that formal tools of game theory are useful for addressing a range of 
problems in highly structured settings (Bates 1987: 704; Scharpf 1997: 105) and as such 
might not be well suited to analyzing government–union interactions in post-commu-
nism. In this context actor constellations are often unstable, and the interacting entities 
are far from being cohesive actors who share more or less similar and fi xed preference 
ordering (see also Munck 2001; Pierson 2004: 60–63). Admittedly, some of these caveats 
can be integrated into a formal model, for instance by specifying different background 
conditions, and by changing payoff structures in each round of the game. Such a move, 
however, would add complexity, which would make the model less manageable and 
thus less useful for depicting the processes of government–union interactions and their 
impact on the development of tripartite institutions. Second, as elaborated above, be-
cause of the high uncertainty that characterizes the postcommunist context, actors need 
to update their perceptions of power and adjust their strategies as the interactions pro-
ceed. To build a formal model of decisionmaking in such circumstances would require 
an explicit use of Bayesian analysis – a technique that has been widely criticized as too 
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complex and artifi cial, and thus ill-equipped to accurately portray empirical reality (see 
Bates et al. 2000; Elster 2000; Morrow 1994: chap. 8).14
Given these considerations, building a heuristic model that identifi es key factors in-
fl uencing power perceptions and outlines a mechanism of how such perceptions af-
fect actors’ strategies and shape particular institutional paths would appear to be more 
appropriate. Such a strategy also allows us to incorporate a more solid empirical basis 
of actors’ institutional and policy preferences, which better illuminates their particular 
choices. It is important to recognize, however, that greater attentiveness to the empiri-
cal basis of actors’ choices does not imply that mere descriptions of government–union 
interactions are on offer. Rather, by following a broad rationalist reasoning, the heu-
ristic model proposed below advances a set of falsifi able hypotheses with regard to the 
choice of actors’ strategies. In doing so, the model elucidates how different sequences 
of choices generate distinct institutional paths of tripartism, which explain the varied 
functioning of these formally similar institutions.
Shaping postcommunist tripartism: Modeling interactions
Initial choices
The starting point for understanding the varied results of postcommunist tripartism 
is to identify factors that can account for cross-national variation of strategies at the 
very beginning of transition. In general, the fi rst democratically elected governments 
have an interest in stabilizing the economy as soon as possible and introducing market 
reforms.15 Given the necessity of reforms in such structurally distorted economies, as 
14 Initial action in Bayesian models is dependent on beliefs about a particular situation, while the 
result of this action serves as a basis for calculating posterior probabilities of outcomes (for 
an overview, see Gelman et al. 1995). The explicit use of such models, however, is problematic 
when actors have different information or beliefs, and when they interact in highly unstable 
environments, such as early transition (see also Beckert 1996; Gilboa/Postlewaite/Schmeidler 
2004). In addition, these models require actors to perform often highly complex calculations, 
which renders them less useful for explaining real-world decisionmaking. These drawbacks not-
withstanding, the general reasoning of Bayesian analysis is useful for it provides a guideline for 
understanding how actors update their beliefs about relative power, and how such beliefs gradu-
ally stabilize and as such produce clear patterns of interaction or institutional paths. 
15 Note that this discussion of government preferences at the onset of transition refers in particular 
to the so-called leading reformers in Central and Eastern Europe, all of which became members 
of the European Union in May 2004. International fi nancial institutions, as well as Association 
Agreements which signaled the possibility of accession to the EU, presented a powerful set of 
constraints and incentives that worked against experimenting with alternative policy solutions. 
International organizations, however, were not the only reason why governments preferred not 
to dilute neoliberal policies through negotiations with unions. In most of these countries, the 
fi rst democratically elected governments were composed predominantly of individuals who 
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well as the proclaimed goals of “catching up” and “joining Europe,” the governments 
in general would prefer to abstain from making substantial policy concessions to or-
ganized labor that could endanger the progress of reform. By the same token, they also 
generally prefer either weak corporatist-type arrangements or the opportunity to avoid 
their establishment altogether. At the same time, however, incumbent politicians prefer 
most of all to stay in power and are therefore interested in maintaining political stabil-
ity. It follows that if they are to fulfi ll both goals simultaneously, they need to fi nd an 
optimal strategy that would both appease unions and produce positive policy outcomes 
that would disarm potential challengers from the political opposition.
To be able to defi ne the optimal strategy toward the unions, the government needs to 
know the power of unions to challenge the reforms. At the outset of transition, however, 
objective indicators of union strength, such as active union membership, tend to be 
unreliable and highly infl ated. At the same time, as the government–union interactions 
start immediately following the regime change, the government cannot rely on previ-
ous experiences to gauge union power since the nature of these interactions during 
communism was entirely different. Under these constraints, the government is likely 
to form a judgment about the potential capacity of unions by relying on some observ-
able indicators. Three indicators in particular are likely to infl uence the government’s 
perception of union power: 
the degree of union concentration (unifi ed/fragmented);
the existence of formal union–party ties (strong/partial/non-existent); and
the mode of inter-union dynamics (cooperation/confl ict).
The degree of union concentration is an important indicator of the unions’ ability to 
coordinate various demands and to follow a clear bargaining strategy. A single, encom-
passing union is not only more likely to uphold agreements, but it also has a potentially 
higher capacity to disrupt the normal functioning of the economy should the govern-
ment fail to take union interests into account. Thus, all things being equal, the existence 
of such an encompassing union structure is expected to increase the government’s in-
centive to follow a pragmatic, responsive strategy to the unions and to facilitate their 
meaningful inclusion in policymaking. Conversely, in cases of bipolar or multipolar 
models of unionism, the government is less likely to be responsive to union demands.
The second indicator that infl uences the choice of strategies is the existence of for-
mal ties between unions and political parties. Ties to unions increase the incentives 
for incumbent politicians to try to convince union leaders of the necessity of reforms 
that might have harmful effects on union constituencies.16 To secure their support, in-
belonged to the anti-communist opposition and who had long advocated the introduction of 
market principles. Indeed, the control of key ministries was usually given to economic teams 
who had promoted neoliberal economic policies anyway.
16 For excellent discussions of how and why union leaders have subordinated material interests of 
1.
2.
3.
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cumbents are likely to offer direct side payments to union leaders (say, in the form of 
parliamentary and government positions) and sporadic concessions to particular union 
sections. Such strategy is rational because – given the imperatives of economic reforms 
and the incumbents’ interest in achieving substantial economic recovery by the next 
elections – the estimated costs of these concessions appear lower than those associated 
with a fully-fl edged corporatist exchange. Moreover, the inclusion of union leaders in 
the political structures of the state empowers the government with the argument that 
interests of labor are suffi ciently represented. Because support from union leaders re-
duces the likelihood of a possible backlash against reforms, the government is likely to 
avoid corporatist institutional arrangements. In contrast, the absence of partisan ties 
precludes such a strategy, increasing the government’s incentive to utilize more actively 
tripartite institutions.17
In addition to these structural attributes, a behavioral variable, namely the mode of in-
ter-union dynamics is likely to enter the government’s calculus when making strategic 
choices. Inter-union confl ict and rivalry increases coordination problems and strength-
ens the government’s position vis-à-vis organized labor, thus weakening its incentives 
to promote corporatist exchange and to cede to union demands. Depending on the par-
ticular context, the government in such cases may try to further undermine the power 
of unions either directly, by neglecting the corporatist exchange, or indirectly, by using 
specifi c organizational and political issues to further propel union divisions. Union co-
operation, on the other hand, indicates a higher degree of union power, and diminishes 
the prospects of such union-adverse strategies.
Different combinations of these three indicators should therefore lead governments to 
make different choices in the initial period of transition (t0). If government strategies 
responded to two broad types – union-adverse (–) and union-favorable (+) – the three 
indicators should allow us to derive predictions about the type of the resulting strategy 
and its approximate intensity (strong, moderate, weak).18 Table 1 portrays these alter-
native scenarios.
their rank and fi le to market reforms undertaken by their partisan allies in several Latin Ameri-
can countries, see Burgess (1999), Murillo (2001), Valenzuela (1991). For related discussions 
of how the catch-all character of labor-linked parties in post-communism affects their policy 
choices and reduces their commitment to labor interests, see Avdagic (2004), Innes (2002), and 
Orenstein (1998). 
17 Similarly, whereas claims by unions associated with opposition parties are more likely to be 
dismissed by incumbent politicians as political attacks orchestrated by the opposition, demands 
from non-aligned unions are more likely to be properly addressed within the institutional 
framework of tripartism.
18 An estimate of the intensity of a particular strategy does not represent some absolute value. 
Rather, the intensity is judged in relative terms, i.e. by comparing strategies across countries at 
the onset of transition, as well as over time in the subsequent steps of the analysis. 
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In short, two polar scenarios, in the upper-left and the bottom-right cells, can be distin-
guished. The government is expected to opt for the most union-favorable strategy (sub-
stantial inclusion in policymaking and policy concessions) when faced with a single, 
encompassing, and politically non-aligned union. Conversely, in cases where competing 
unions have strong formal links to different political parties, the government is in an 
advantageous position and is likely to choose a strong union-adverse strategy (exclu-
sion from policymaking, propelling inter-union rivalry and direct cooptation, low con-
cessions).
Most of the remaining cells represent the in-between cases, where the two broad strate-
gies are likely to have lower intensity than in the two polar cases. For instance, a mod-
erate union-favorable strategy (moderate inclusion and policy concessions) is likely to 
be chosen when fragmented, politically independent unions cooperate with each other 
(+ +). A moderate union-adverse strategy (propelling rivalry and partial cooptation, 
weak inclusion and policy concessions) is expected when fragmented and confl icting 
unions have partial links to political parties, i.e. when only some unions are politically 
allied and when these links are not particularly strong (– –). A mild union-favorable 
strategy (weak inclusion and policy concessions) is likely in cases with partly politically 
aligned and generally cooperative unions (+). Finally, a weak union-adverse strategy 
(propelling rivalry, weak inclusion and policy concessions) will be chosen when politi-
cally non-aligned unions have a confl icting or highly competitive relationship (–).
In situations where a single and cohesive union has strong formal ties to a political 
party, the strategy is more diffi cult to determine as it may be infl uenced by union size, 
leadership, the type of benefi ts offered to the party, and the government–opposition 
dynamics.19 The two fi elds marked with “n.a.” denote unlikely cases. While the fi rst one 
– corresponding to a single/cohesive and partially aligned union – is self-evident, it 
might be necessary to elaborate why the case of cooperative unions with strong ties to 
different political parties was improbable in East Central Europe. At the onset of tran-
sition, unions in countries with fragmented labor movements were usually at logger-
heads over issues such as ideology and the role they played during communism. As the 
“old/new” or the “successor/anti-communist” axis represented the strongest division 
19 Empirically, however, no such case was present in East Central Europe at the onset of transi-
tion. 
Table 1 Expected government strategy at t0
    Organizational structure of unions
Single/Unifi ed Fragmented
Mode of union interaction
Union-party links Cooperation Confl ict
Absent +++ ++ –
Partial n.a. + – –
Strong Indeterminate n.a. – – –
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between the unions, a cooperative relationship at the beginning of transition would 
have been highly unlikely if such unions entered into separate political alliances.
Following the choice of government strategy the unions can either support or oppose 
government policies. The strategy that the unions settle on is likely to refl ect their re-
spective views about transformation. In contrast to incumbent politicians who due to 
the imperatives of economic transformation come to share largely similar institutional 
and policy preferences, union preferences are likely to be infl uenced by their specifi c 
origin. More precisely, unions that initially arose in opposition to the communist re-
gime are likely to be more tolerant or even supportive of market reforms that may ad-
versely affect the material interests of their constituencies. Their initial support for such 
policies stems from cognitive frames and ideological views that they formed during 
their struggle against the communist regime. In this way, the past translates into present 
choices. Successor communist unions, on the other hand, face not only the direct costs 
of reforms and a generally negative image, but also a decreasing infl uence in enterprise 
decisionmaking and the prospect of losing signifi cant material assets acquired during 
communism. Given these considerations and the related concern to minimize the de-
cline of their membership, they are likely to prefer reforms that entail tangible and im-
mediate compensation measures to general promises of long-term economic progress. 
Whether these preferences lead to actual opposition to government policies depends on 
how they perceive their capacity to obtain these preferences.
Subsequent choices
The initial strategies do not necessarily remain unchanged. As the interactions proceed, 
actors will re-evaluate their previous choices and decide between “staying on course” or 
“strategy alteration.” According to the guidelines of the proposed approach, the choice 
of strategy at tx is likely to be affected by two considerations: (a) the experience drawn 
from interactions at tx–1, and (b) the current state of the world, refl ecting in particular 
fl uctuations in the economic conjuncture, the government–opposition dynamics, and 
the inter-union dynamics. Given the complexity of these considerations, predicting the 
exact type of strategy after the period t0 becomes increasingly diffi cult. However, basic 
assumptions of the model allow us to establish conditions that are likely to trigger a 
shift of strategies.
Table 2 provides a basic picture of the conditions that are likely to result in a shift of 
government strategy. Because the core objective of incumbent politicians is to maintain 
or augment their power, we should expect a change in their strategy when they encoun-
ter a credible threat to their ability to attain this objective. Accordingly, they are likely to 
shift from a union-adverse to a union-favorable strategy at tx when they perceive their 
relative power as decreasing. Specifi cally, such an assessment is likely to be made when 
the union response at tx–1 presents a strong challenge to government policies, and when 
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the government faces a political crisis and its policies are challenged by an increasingly 
strong opposition. Conversely, if incumbents perceive a considerable increase in their 
relative power, they are more likely to shift from a union-favorable to a union-adverse 
strategy. This is likely to be the case when the interactions at tx–1 indicate union impo-
tence, and when economic conditions deteriorate dramatically, thus generating a broad 
political consensus for non-negotiated reforms.
Establishing the conditions that underpin a shift in union strategy is more complex, not 
least because the institutional and policy preferences of these actors are more diversi-
fi ed. As elaborated above, early choices of unions between supporting and opposing 
government policies have often been colored by their respective origin and the associat-
ed identities. Crucially, the preferences of union leaders are often not the same as those 
of their constituencies (see Crouch 1982; Levi 2005). Union leaders, for instance, might 
prefer institutional and policy choices that offer ideological satisfaction and promise 
long-term gains for labor, while their rank and fi le might be interested primarily in 
maximizing their short-term material gains. Divergence between leaders’ and members’ 
preferences is likely to become particularly pronounced when unions have strong parti-
san ties to a governing party undertaking comprehensive market reforms (see also Bur-
gess 1999; Murillo 2001). Because such alliances bring considerable personal rewards 
and often ideological satisfaction to union leaders, they will be inclined to support gov-
ernment policies even if these impose sacrifi ces on their constituencies.
However, like incumbent politicians who want to stay in power, union leaders primarily 
want to avoid being replaced by potential competitors (see also Murillo 2001). Accord-
ingly, their strategies need to incorporate preferences of their rank and fi le, if not at all 
times, then certainly when facing the risk of replacement. Thus, the union’s position 
and its relative power vis-à-vis the government is only one concern that union leaders 
have to take into account when evaluating their strategy at tx. In addition, their choices 
will be affected by the response from their members, who may endorse the leadership 
choices or, alternatively, lend support to their internal competitors (vertical competi-
tion) or to other unions (horizontal competition).
Having these qualifi cations in mind, Table 3 identifi es the basic conditions that are likely 
to generate a shift in union strategy. We should expect allied union leaders to withdraw 
Table 2 Conditions triggering change in government strategy
General conditions Specifi c considerations
tx–1 → tx Perceptions of own
relative power
Previous 
experience
Current state 
of the world
UA → UF Decreasing Strong union 
response at tx–1
Policy challenge 
(strong opposition)
UF → UA Increasing Weak union 
response at tx–1
Policy consensus 
(weak opposition)
UA = union-adverse strategy; UF = union-favorable strategy.
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their support for government policies when their position is threatened by an increas-
ingly strong vertical and horizontal competition, and when they witness a decline in 
the power of their government. Relevant indicators would include, for instance, protest 
actions organized by internal contenders, losing members to other unions, and an in-
creasingly strong popular support for opposition parties. These conditions will induce a 
change in the strategy of allied leaders, because they signal a decline in their power to at-
tain their institutional and policy preferences and their core objectives simultaneously. 
Since this situation also signals a decline in the government’s power, non-allied union 
leaders are likely to strengthen their opposition to government policies because their 
capacity to attain their institutional and policy preferences increases under such condi-
tions. Conversely, the union leadership is likely to abandon opposition to government 
policies when the absence of a credible vertical and horizontal competition coincides 
with a situation of a broad-based policy consensus and a relatively strong government. 
Such conditions indicate a low threat to allied union leaders who derive personal ben-
efi ts – in the form of either political rewards or ideological satisfaction – from support-
ing government policies. At the same time, this situation signals a decline in the capacity 
of non-allied union leaders to extract concessions from the government.
Interaction outcomes: Distinct institutional paths
This model of choices emphasizes the relevance of perceptions of power. The condi-
tions that signal a change in actors’ power serve as clues about the level of costs and 
benefi ts that they are likely to incur in the event of staying on course or, alternatively, 
of altering their strategy. Actors refl ect upon these conditions because they help them 
estimate their ability to attain their preferred institutional and policy outcomes while 
securing their core objectives. In line with the assumptions outlined above, we should 
expect incumbent politicians and union leaders to choose a strategy that promises the 
most advantageous or the least disadvantageous consequences for their core objectives. 
Because previous responses to actors’ strategies affect their subsequent choices, over 
time such strategic maneuvering will produce particular institutional paths character-
ized by different patterns of government–union interactions. These paths, in turn, de-
Table 3 Conditions triggering change in the strategy of union leaders
General conditions Specifi c considerations
tx–1 → tx Perceptions 
of own relative power
Horizontal and 
vertical competition
Current 
state of the world
Allied Non-allied
S → O Decreasing Increasing High Policy challenge 
(strong opposition)
O → S Increasing Decreasing Low Policy consensus 
(weak opposition)
S = support for government reforms; O = opposition to reforms.
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termine the prospects of the corporatist-type exchange and the functioning of tripartite 
institutions as the main arenas that facilitate such exchange.
Figure 1 and the associated Table 4 identify possible paths that can be shaped through 
different combinations of actors’ choices. To depict alternative paths, this schema sim-
plifi es signifi cantly the interaction process by presenting it as an infi nitely repeated 
encounter between two actors: government (G ) and organized labor (L). In the do-
main of their interactions, each actor can choose from their action set (Ά) consisting of 
two basic types of strategies. Government can undertake reforms by following either a 
union-favorable or a union-adverse strategy, Ά (G ) = {UF, UA}, and organized labor can 
in turn either support or oppose government policies, Ά (L) = {S, O}. In accordance with 
the model proposed above, each agent selects a strategy that appears the best option 
given their perceptions of their capacity to fulfi ll simultaneously their institutional and 
policy preferences and their core objectives. It follows that each round (tx) is character-
ized by a particular strategy combination (ω) belonging to a set of four possible strategy 
combinations Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, where ω1 = (UF, S); ω2 = (UF, O); ω3 = (UA, S); and 
ω4 = (UA, O). Let us suppose that an institutional path is defi ned by the prevalence of a 
particular strategy combination played by the two actors over a certain period of time. 
Since the interactions in each round refl ect a choice between the four possible strat-
egy combinations, a repeated occurrence of the respective combinations over a num-
ber of rounds would shape four ideal institutional paths, represented by bold lines in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1 Path formation: possible plays over time
S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O
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UF UA UF UA UF UA UF UA
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G = government; L = labor; UF = union-favorable; UA = union-adverse; S = support; O = opposition; 
P1, P2, P3, P4 = institutional paths corresponding to the four ideal types of interaction patterns (see Table 4).
0
G G G G
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For example, when strategy combination ω1 = (UF, S) turns out to be dominant, we can 
assume that a path of pragmatic bargaining (P1) has been established. In this scenario, 
G predominantly follows some form of a union-favorable strategy by including L in the 
corporatist-type formulation of policies and reforms and offering some concessions, 
and L most of the time supports G ’s course of action and policy choices. In contrast, the 
predominance of ω2 = (UA, O) would refl ect a path of confl ict (P2) in which G repeat-
edly attempts to exclude L from policymaking and thus to avoid potential concessions, 
while L most of the time responds with some form of opposition. The dominant play 
of ω3 = (UA, S) would lead to the establishment of a path of union cooptation (P3), re-
fl ecting the cases in which L usually supports G ’s actions and non-negotiated policies 
despite generally adverse effects they might have for L. The prevalence of ω4 = (UF, O) 
denotes a path of state capture (P4). In this case, L – aiming to achieve a higher level of 
concessions – frequently opposes G ’s actions and policies despite their relatively favor-
able character for L.20 Finally, when no dominant strategy combination emerges prior 
to the period tn, this pattern can be characterized as a path of unstable bargaining (Px). 
In Figure 1 this pattern would correspond to any of the branches that, after the second 
decision node for G, depart from the four ideal patterns, i.e. all the branches marked by 
thin lines.
It is unlikely, however, that a particular path will be shaped through the process where a 
single strategy combination is played in each round prior to tn. As the interactions pro-
ceed under uncertainty, strategies in each round are formulated on the basis of actors’ 
perceptions of power, which can change as they subsequently refl ect upon responses to 
their previous strategy and shifts in relevant environmental conditions. As such percep-
tions change, so do the strategies. Put differently, “boundedly rational” and “refl exive” 
agents will try to use what they perceive as favorable moments or openings to modify or 
change their strategy so as to improve their position. Sometimes such actions are suc-
cessful, and sometimes they are not, because uncertainty can produce misperceptions 
that result in ineffective strategies. Such misperceptions, though, are most likely in the 
20 Note, however, that this scenario would be more relevant in the cases of very limited or stalled 
reforms, such as some of the former Soviet Union countries where state subsidies continued to 
be a prominent source of fi nancing for many sectors of the economy. 
Table 4 Strategy combinations and the resulting institutional paths
Ω = {ω1, ω2 , ω3 , ω4 } ωi  /  ∑ω, t ( 0,1,…n–1) P, tn
ω1 = (UF, S) ω1 = dominant ⇒ P1 = pragmatic bargaining
ω2 = (UA, O) ω2 = dominant ⇒ P2 = confl ictual relationship
ω3 = (UA, S) ω3 = dominant ⇒ P3 = union cooptation
ω4 = (UF, O) ω4 = dominant ⇒ P4 = state capture
No dominant ω ⇒ Px = unstable bargaining
Column 1 = a set of possible strategy combinations; column 2 = prevalence of a 
particular strategy combination in all strategy combinations observable from 
period t0 to tn–1; column 3 = resulting institutional paths at tn.
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early transformation when the world is in its most turbulent state and when actors are 
least capable of judging the power of others to challenge their preferred actions.
Over a number of rounds, however, actors learn about the likely capacity of their op-
ponents from their responses in the previous rounds of interaction.21 Initial percep-
tions or subjective beliefs about the opponent’s power, if regularly confi rmed by the 
observed reality, are likely to become accepted as their objective power, thus infl uencing 
the pattern of future interactions.22 Perceptions, nonetheless, continue to be important, 
but mainly for estimating how environmental shifts might affect the already accepted 
power balances. In other words, subjective beliefs become in effect objectifi ed when, in 
the course of a repeated play, perceptions of relative power converge or become shared 
by the interacting agents.23 As the perceptions of each other’s power gradually stabilize, 
actors start behaving in a more obvious Bayesian way, thus revising their perceptions 
less frequently unless some major event challenges these beliefs.24 Taken-for-granted 
beliefs about the balance of power, in turn, have a salient impact on the development of 
the institution of tripartism since they infl uence the way in which the actors are likely 
to continue playing the game. For instance, the greater the power asymmetries that be-
come accepted in this process, the less the likelihood that the weaker actor will be able 
to change the pattern of interaction or redirect the established institutional path by al-
tering their strategy.25 Under conditions of large power disparities, the stronger actor is 
unlikely to perceive such a strategy shift as a credible threat to its own goals because the 
record of past interactions indicates the other actor’s limited capacity to signifi cantly 
alter the terms of exchange unfavorable to their interests.26 In sum, it is particular power 
balances that become accepted through repeated interaction that determine the terms 
of exchange in the corporatist-type forums and thus the very functioning and role of 
these institutions.
21 In this respect, G is in a better position than L. Since L is usually composed more or less of the 
same actors over tn, G can draw lessons from its predecessor’s experience with L. The situation 
is more diffi cult for L because these actors need to interact with an often-changing G. 
22 I am indebted to Wolfgang Streeck for discussions on this point. 
23 This corresponds to Aoki’s (2001: 10) understanding of institutions as systems of shared beliefs 
about a way in which the game is repeatedly played according to the endogenous rules, i.e. the 
rules not determined formally, but rather “endogenously created through the strategic interac-
tions of agents, held in the minds of agents, and thus self-sustaining.” 
24 I thank Colin Crouch for suggesting this formulation. 
25 Strategy alteration refl ects either a response to a change in environmental conditions or an 
endogenously driven change, such as the conscious effort to improve one’s position through 
actions facilitated by some form of learning.
26 By the same line of reasoning, redirecting a path should prove less diffi cult when the percep-
tions of relative power have not yet stabilized. When the power balance is more even and widely 
accepted – which is the case with the path of pragmatic bargaining – actors will have strong 
incentives to remain on the path. Provided that actors seek to improve their position, the path of 
confl ict is not likely to be sustainable in the long run. In this case, the actors would be expected 
to try shifting to a path that promises relatively higher gains. The resulting outcome, however, 
is not clear cut. The path of pragmatic bargaining is not the only possible outcome because 
the relative costs of a prolonged confl ict might not be equal for both actors. Consequently, the 
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Some might object that differences in the pattern of interaction are not important as 
long as formal institutional rules are the same. Such arguments would interpret dif-
ferences in the pattern of interaction as minor variation along the same broad path 
which is more or less determined by the formal properties of tripartite institutions. For 
instance, those emphasizing the comprehensive formal responsibilities of these institu-
tions always see some form of corporatism (e.g. Iankova 1998), while those who stress 
the non-binding character of the agreements reached in these forums see primarily 
government unilateralism (e.g. Ost 2000). I argue, however, that this reliance on formal 
properties leads to false conclusions because it is precisely the way in which tripartite 
institutions are practiced that infl uences how actors subsequently interpret and further 
enact these institutions. Correspondingly, the proposed model suggests that, depend-
ing on the perceptions of relative power between government and unions, subsequent 
strategies adopted by these actors, and the resulting pattern of interaction that emerges 
through their repeated play, the institution of tripartism can be interpreted and enacted 
by actors in different ways. As a result, the role and impact of these formally similar in-
stitutions in policymaking may vary considerably across different contexts.
A guideline for applying the model
This heuristic model captures the dynamism of government–union interactions and 
facilitates a comparative analysis of the process of development of postcommunist tri-
partism. By contextualizing actors’ institutional and policy preferences and allowing for 
their change, it is sensitive to both contextual and sequential elements of the analysis. 
At the same time, because it anchors actors’ choices in their aspiration to maintain or 
augment their power, the model advances a set of falsifi able propositions with regard 
to strategic choices that incumbent politicians and union leaders make in the course of 
postcommunist transformation. In this way, the proposed framework corresponds to 
some recent calls for a synthesis of general theory and process-oriented narrative analy-
sis (see Abbot 1992; Abell 1993; Kiser 1996; Levi 2002; Pedriana 2005).
In accordance with the specifi c propositions of the model, we should expect actors’ 
choices to refl ect their respective perceptions of how the dynamics of interaction affects 
their ability to fulfi ll their institutional and policy preferences while maintaining their 
power. For each actor, the model specifi es the relevant factors that can be expected to 
shape these perceptions. As such, the model lends itself to an empirical test that can 
actor who is more willing to bear these costs might continue with the same strategy hoping to 
be able eventually to dictate the subsequent terms of exchange – which, in other words, would 
mean shifting to a path with more asymmetric power balances. This reasoning is broadly in line 
with the logic of the Rubinstein’s bargaining model (1982), which suggests that a more “patient” 
player has an advantage. 
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be undertaken by constructing analytical narratives that give explicit consideration to 
these factors. Such narratives would need to:
test whether the initial choice of strategies corresponds to the expectations of the 
model, as outlined in Table 1;
explore whether the shifts in actors’ strategies in later rounds concur with the model’s 
predictions, as specifi ed in Tables 2 and 3; and
identify the type of institutional path that has been generated through repeated in-
teractions, as illustrated by Table 4.
Because the proposed model emphasizes the infl uence of specifi c historical-structural 
contexts on actors’ institutional and policy preferences, such narratives necessitate en-
gaging in a detailed analysis of the specifi cs of a place and time. A solid reliance on 
interviews, documents, the press, and secondary literature is essential if one wants to 
discern the origins of actors’ institutional and policy preferences, their perceptions of 
relative power, their beliefs about available options, and their strategies.
This type of analysis, therefore, combines general and particular causal factors to ex-
plain the development of distinct institutional paths. While such analysis allows induc-
tive inference of the impact of historical legacies and the structural contexts on actors’ 
identities and their institutional and policy preferences to be included, it requires that 
narratives of interaction be constructed in line with predominantly deductive reason-
ing incorporated in the model of government–union interactions. In predicting par-
ticular strategies and specifying the conditions for strategy shifts, this model employs 
deductive reasoning to illuminate how and why a particular pattern of action unfolds 
in a causal sequence.
In a separate work I have evaluated this model by constructing analytical narratives of 
government–union interactions in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (Avdagic 
2006). In demonstrating the formation of a path of pragmatic bargaining, unstable bar-
gaining, and cooptation respectively, these narratives offer important insights into the 
varied development and role of formally similar corporatist-type structures in the three 
countries. An evaluation of the model through further empirical cases would require 
equally detailed analytical narratives. The guidance provided here could serve to disci-
pline such narratives and thus render them theoretically coherent and comparable.
Conclusions: Power, perceptions and institutional development
How strong is the constraining capacity of young institutions, and how can they coor-
dinate behavior on a single path when their formal rules are ambiguous or the costs of 
non-compliance with these rules are low? In addressing this question, this paper has 
–
–
–
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criticized analyses that draw a sharp line between extraordinary times of change when 
new formal institutions are established and subsequent periods of institutional stasis in 
which behavior is purportedly driven by these new formal rules. Instead, this paper ad-
vances the argument that young institutions in particular cannot be taken for granted, 
as actors are more likely to perceive them as malleable. Consequently, as Streeck and 
Thelen have argued, actors might try to interpret and use such institutions in a way 
that advances their particular goals and purposes or bypass them when they appear to 
confl ict with their interests (2005b: 19). Thus, rather than reading behavior off formal 
rules, our attention needs to be redirected to exploring the consequences of actors’ on-
going strategic maneuvering for the functioning – and thus the eventual fate – of young 
institutions.
In this paper, I have attempted to do this by focusing on postcommunist peak-level 
tripartism – a formally similar institution whose functioning has varied signifi cantly 
across national contexts. Understanding this variation in institutional development, I 
argue, requires unpacking the political dynamics of government–union interactions. I 
have shown how such interactions can be heuristically modeled as a sequence of stra-
tegic choices that government offi cials and union leaders make. In this model, different 
historical experiences and structural contexts infl uence actors’ preferences with regard 
to the desirability of corporatist-type arrangements and specifi c policies, while the as-
piration to maintain power defi nes their common underlying interests. Accordingly, the 
model posits that the choices that these actors make in the course of interaction refl ect 
their perceptions of their ability to attain preferred institutional and policy outcomes 
without compromising their core objectives. Over time, this kind of strategic maneu-
vering is likely to reveal a mutually accepted balance of power, which then provides con-
straints and incentives for particular types of strategies. This balance of power, rather 
than formal rules, determines the actual terms of exchange and thus the enactment of 
this newly established institution. Hence, depending on the particular power balances 
that emerge through such interactions, the functioning of the formally similar corpo-
ratist-type institutions can differ considerably across national contexts.
The framework presented in this paper depicts the development and enactment of peak-
level tripartism as a contentious process in which the participating actors try to push 
through their preferred outcomes of transformation, entailing different roles for this 
institution. As such, my framework resembles the power-distributional view of institu-
tions, which conceptualizes institutional development as a contest over rules in which 
actors try to achieve institutional equilibria most favorable to their interests (Bates 
1987; Knight 1992; Moe 1990). Two aspects, however, differentiate my framework from 
standard power-distributional accounts.
First, while such analyses predominantly focus on bargaining processes that character-
ize the design of major political institutions in particular (see, for instance, Colomer 
1995; Frye 1997; Przeworski 1991), the focus here is less on struggles over formal rules, 
and more over the uses to which newly established corporatist-type institutions are 
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put. Given the ambiguity of formal rules of tripartism, the actual role assigned to this 
regulative institution can lay anywhere along the continuum from ensuring a compre-
hensive inclusion of unions in the formulation and implementation of reform policies 
to presenting a largely empty shell that facilitates the discussion without much impact 
on the shape of substantive policies. The contention here, therefore, is about the actual 
role and infl uence that such institutions have in shaping and governing these young 
capitalisms.
Second, accounts that explain institutional outcomes in terms of the distribution of 
power usually rely on quantifi able or objective measures of power. This is not only the 
case with rational choice analyses of the design of political institutions, which usually 
assess power on the basis of election results and pre-election opinion polls (see Frye 
1997; Geddes 1996; Schedler 2002); structural analyses that link welfare state policies 
to the power of unions also employ quantifi able measures, such as union density, cen-
tralization, and participation of social-democratic parties in offi ce (e.g. Hicks 1999; 
Huber/Stephens 2001). In contrast, my framework downplays such objective measures 
of power and emphasizes instead perceptions of relative power. Objective measures are 
of little help if one wants to understand the logic of government–union interactions 
in post-communism, where initial power balances are neither known nor easily ascer-
tained. In the context of such uncertainty, I argue, actors rely on their beliefs about 
relative power to gauge the likely response of others to various strategies, and to cor-
respondingly choose a strategy that they believe would yield the highest utility. Because 
the development and enactment of corporatist-type institutions involves repeated 
interactions, actors regularly update such perceptions to estimate the potential costs 
and benefi ts of continuing or altering their previous strategies. When chosen strate-
gies repeatedly yield expected results, a particular balance of power becomes mutually 
accepted or taken for granted. This power balance in turn determines how the institu-
tion of tripartism is subsequently practiced. My explication therefore concurs with the 
standard power-distributional accounts that institutional outcomes refl ect particular 
power balances, while making an important clarifi cation that those balances are not 
determined by some “objective” measure at the time of institutional establishment, but 
rather are “worked out” in the course of interactions.
Avdagic: One Path or Several? 31
References
Abbot, Andrew, 1992: From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism. In: Sociological Methods 
& Research 20, 428–455.
Abell, Peter, 1993: Some Aspects of Narrative Method. In: Journal of Mathematical Sociology 18, 93–
134.
Ágh, Attila, 1996: Meso-Politics in Central Europe: Fighting with the Infantile Disease in European-
ization and Democratization. In: Attila Ágh/Gabriella Illonszki (eds.), Parliaments and Organ-
ised Interests: The Second Steps. Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 241–252.
Alexander, Gerard, 2001: Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation. In: Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 13, 249–270.
——, 2004: Power, Interests, and the Causal Effects of Institutions. Paper presented at the Conference 
of Europeanists. Chicago, 11–13 March 2004.
Aoki, Masahiko, 2001: Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Avdagic, Sabina, 2004: Loyalty and Power in Union Party Alliances: Labor Politics in Postcommunism. 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/7. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. <www.
mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/abstracts/dp04-7.html>
——, 2005: State-Labour Relations in East Central Europe: Explaining Variations in Union Effective-
ness. In: Socio-Economic Review 3, 25–53.
——, 2006: Power Perceptions and Institutional Development: Government-Union Interactions in Post-
communism. Book Manuscript. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Bates, Robert H., et al., 2000: Analytic Narratives. In: Social Science History 24, 685–696. 
Bates, Robert H., 1987: Contra Contractarianism: Some Refl ections on the New Institutionalism. In: 
Politics & Society 16, 387–401.
Beckert, Jens, 1996: What Is Sociological about Economic Sociology? Uncertainty and the Embed-
dedness of Economic Action. In: Theory and Society 25, 803–840.
——, 2002: Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Effi ciency. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Burgess, Katrina, 1999: Loyalty Dilemmas and Market Reform: Party-Union Alliances under Stress in 
Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela. In: World Politics 52, 105–134.
Carey, John M., 2000: Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions. In: Comparative Political Studies 33, 
735–761.
Casale, Giuseppe, 1999a: Tripartism and Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern European 
Countries. In: Giuseppe Casale (ed.), Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: 
International Labour Organization, Central and Eastern European Team, 1–36.
Collier, Ruth Berins /David Collier, 1991: Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Colomer, Josep, 1995: Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe. In: Journal of Democracy 6, 74–
85.
Crouch, Colin, 1982: Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, UK: Fontana Paper-
back.
——, 2005: Capitalist Diversity and Change: A Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurs. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Crouch, Colin/Henry Farrell, 2004: Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to 
the New Determinism. In: Rationality and Society 16, 5–43.
Crowley, Stephen, 2004: Explaining Labor Weakness in Postcommunist Europe: Historical Legacies 
and Comparative Perspective. In: East European Politics and Societies 18, 394–429. 
Deeg, Richard, 2005: Path Dependency, Institutional Complementarity, and Change in National 
Business Systems. In: Glenn Morgan/Richard Whitley/Eli Moen (eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Complementarities, Contradictions and Capability Development in an International Context. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 21–52.
32 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 /5
Easter, Gerald M., 1997: Preferences for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia 
and the NIS. In: World Politics 49, 184–211.
EIRO, 2004a: National-Level Tripartism and EMU in the New EU Member States and Candidate Coun-
tries. European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line. European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working Conditions. <www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int>
Elster, Jon, 1993: Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe. In: Public Administration 71, 169–217.
——, 2000: Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition. In: American Political Science 
Review 94, 685–695.
Emirbayer, Mustafa/Ann Mische, 1998: What Is Agency? In: American Journal of Sociology 103, 962–
1023.
Fligstein, Neil, 1999: Fields, Power, and Social Skill: A Critical Analysis of the New Institutionalisms. 
Working Paper 01. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations.
Frye, Timothy, 1997: A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies. In: Compara-
tive Political Studies 30, 523–552.
Garrett, Geoffrey/Barry R. Weingast, 1993: Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the Euro-
pean Community’s Internal Market. In: Judith Goldstein/Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
173–206.
Geddes, Barbara, 1996: Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. In: Arend Lijphart/Carlos H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democra-
cies: Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 15–42.
Gelman, Andrew, et al., 1995: Bayesian Data Analysis. London: Chapman & Hall.
Gilboa, Itzhak/Andrew Postlewaite/David Schmeidler, 2004: Rationality of Belief or: Why Bayesianism 
Is neither Neccessary nor Suffi cient for Rationality. PIER Working Paper 04–011. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania, Penn Institute for Economic Research.
Goodin, Robert E., 1999: Rationality Redux: Refl ections on Herbert A. Simon’s Vision of Politics. 
In: James E. Alt/Margaret Levi/Elinor Ostrom (eds.), Competition and Cooperation: Conversa-
tions with Nobelists About Economics and Political Science. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
60–84.
Gould, Stephen J., 1982: The Meaning of Punctuated Equilibrium, and Its Role in Validating a His-
torical Approach to Macroevolution. In: Roger Milkman (ed.), Perspectives on Evolution. South-
erland, MA: Sinauer, 83–104.
Green, Donald P./Ian Shapiro, 1994: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications 
in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Greif, Avner/David Laitin, 2002: How Do Self-Enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change? Institu-
tional Reinforcement and Quasi-Parameters. Unpublished Paper. Palo Alto, CA.
Hattam, Victoria C., 1993: Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the 
United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hay, Colin/Daniel Wincott, 1998: Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism. In: Political 
Studies 46, 951–957.
Héthy, Lajos, 1994: Tripartism in Eastern Europe. In: Richard Hyman/Anthony Ferner (eds.), New 
Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell, 312–336.
——, 1995: Tripartism and Public Policy Formulation in Hungary. In: Robert Kyloh (ed.), Tripartism 
on Trial: Tripartite Consultations and Negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe. Geneva: Inter-
national Labour Organization.
Hicks, Alex M., 1999: Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Huber, Evelyne/John D. Stephens, 2001: Development and Crisis of the Welfare States: Parties and Poli-
cies in Global Markets. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Iankova, Elena, 1998: The Transformative Corporatism of Eastern Europe. In: East European Politics 
and Societies 12, 222–264.
——, 2002: Eastern European Capitalism in the Making. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.
Avdagic: One Path or Several? 33
Innes, Abby, 2002: Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe – The Great Electoral Lottery. In: 
Comparative Politics 35, 85–104.
Jones, Bryan D., 1999: Bounded Rationality. In: Annual Review of Political Science 2, 297–321.
——, 2001: Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and Governance. Chicago, IL: 
Chicago University Press.
Karl, Terry Lynn/Philippe Schmitter, 1991: Modes of Transition in Southern and Eastern Europe, 
Southern and Central America. In: International Social Science Journal 128, 269–284.
Kiser, Edgar, 1996: The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Theory 
Can Contribute. In: Politics & Society 24, 249–271.
Knight, Jack, 1992: Institutions and Social Confl ict. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kohl, Heribert/Hans-Wolfgang Platzer (eds.), 2004: Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: Transformation and Intergration. A Comparison of the Eight New EU Member States. Brus-
sels: European Trade Union Institute.
Korpi, Walter, 1985: Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Confl ict: On Causal and Intentional 
Explanations in the Study of Power. In: Sociological Theory 3, 31–45.
——, 2001: Contentious Institutions: An Augmented Rational-Action Analysis of the Origins and 
Path-Dependency of Welfare State Institutions in Western Countries. In: Rationality and Society 
13, 235–283.
Krasner, Stephen, 1984: Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics. 
In: Comparative Politics 16, 223–246.
——, 1988: Sovereignty: An Institutional Analysis. In: Comparative Political Studies 21, 66–94.
Ládo, Mariá, 1996: Continuity and Changes in Tripartism in Hungary. In: Attila Ágh/Gabriella Illon-
szki (eds.), Parliaments and Organized Interests: The Second Steps. Budapest: Hungarian Centre 
for Democracy Studies, 158–172.
Levi, Margaret, 1998: Conscription: The Price of Citizenship. In: Robert H. Bates et al. (eds.), Analytic 
Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 109–147.
——, 2002: Modeling Complex Historical Processes with Analytic Narratives. In: Renate Mayntz 
(ed.), Akteure – Mechanismen – Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen. Frank-
furt a.M.: Campus, 108–127.
——, 2005: Inducing Preferences within Organizations: The Case of Unions. In: Ira Katznelson/
Barry R. Weingast (eds.), Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and 
Rational Choice Institutionalism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 219–246.
Lijphart, Arend, 1992: Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland, 1989–91. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, 207–223.
Locke, Richard M./Kathleen Thelen, 1995: Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized Compari-
sons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics. In: Politics & Society 23, 337–367.
Luong, Pauline Jones, 2002: Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: 
Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mahoney, James, 2000: Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. In: Theory and Society 29, 507–
548.
Mansfeldová, Zdenka, 1995: Tripartism in the Czech Republic. In: Robert Kyloh (ed.), Tripartism on 
Trial: Tripartite Consultations and Negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe. Geneva: Interna-
tional Labour Organization, 60–78.
March, James G., 1978: Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice. In: Bell 
Journal of Economics 9, 587–608.
——, 1994: A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. New York: Free Press.
March, James G./Johan P. Olsen, 1976: Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen: Universitets-
forlaget.
McFaul, Michael, 2002: The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transiti-
ons in the Postcommunist World. In: World Politics 54, 212–244.
Moe, Terry M., 1990: Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. In: Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organization 6, 213–261.
34 MPIfG Discussion Paper 06 /5
Morrow, James D., 1994: Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Müller, Wolfgang C./Kaare Strøm (eds.), 1999: Policy, Offi ce or Votes? How Political Parties in Western 
Europe Make Hard Decisions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Munck, Gerardo L., 2001: Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Con-
cerns. In: World Politics 53, 173–204.
Munck, Gerardo/Carol Skalnik Leff, 1997: Modes of Transition and Democratization in Comparati-
ve Perspective. In: Comparative Politics 29, 343–362.
Murillo, Maria Victoria, 2001: Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin Ameri-
ca. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Offe, Claus, 1996: Designing Institutions in East European Transitions. In: Robert E. Goodin (ed.), 
The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur, 1982: The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Orenstein, Mitchell A., 1998: A Retrospective: Václav Klaus: Revolutionary and Parliamentarian. In: 
East European Constitutional Review 7. <www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num1/>
Orenstein, Mitchell A./Lisa E. Hale, 2001: Corporatist Renaissance in Post-communist Central Euro-
pe? In: Christopher Candland/Rudra Sil (eds.), The Politics of Labor in a Global Age: Continui-
ty and Change in Late-industrializing and Post-socialist Economies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 258–283.
Ost, David, 2000: Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism and Postcommu-
nist Class Identities. In: Politics & Society 28, 503–530.
Pedersen, Ove K./Karsten Ronit/Jerzy Hausner, 1993: Evolution of Interest Representation and Deve-
lopment of the Labour Market in Post-Socialist Countries. Cracow: Cracow Academy of Econo-
mics.
Pedriana, Nicholas, 2005: Rational Choice, Structural Context, and Increasing Returns: A Strategy 
for Analytic Narrative in Historical Sociology. In: Sociological Methods & Research 33, 349–382.
Pierson, Paul, 2000: Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. In: American 
Political Science Review 94, 251–268.
——, 2004: Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Przeworski, Adam, 1991: Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Euro-
pe and Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Reutter, Werner, 1996: Tripartism without Corporatism: Trade Unions in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. In: Attila Ágh/Gabriella Illonszki (eds.), Parliaments and Organized Interests: The Second 
Steps. Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 59–78.
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. In: Econometrica 50, 97–109.
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1997: Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Schedler, Andreas, 2002: The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections. In: International Politi-
cal Science Review 23, 103–122.
Searle, John R., 1995: The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Seleny, Anna, 1999: Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confronta-
tion in Hungary and Poland. In: World Politics 51, 484–519.
Simon, Herbert A., 1957: Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
——, 1998: What Is an “Explanation” of Behavior?” In: Paul Thagard (ed.), Mind Readings: Introduc-
tory Selections on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1–28.
Stark, David/László Bruszt, 1998: Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Streeck, Wolfgang/Kathleen Thelen (eds.), 2005a: Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Ad-
vanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
——, 2005b: Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. In: Wolfgang 
Streeck/Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–39.
Avdagic: One Path or Several? 35
Tatur, Melanie, 1995: Towards Corporatism? The Transformation of Interest Politics and Interest 
Regulation in Eastern Europe. In: Eckhard J. Dittrich/Gerdt Schmidt/Richard Whitley (eds.), 
Industrial Transformation in Europe: Process and Contexts. London: Sage, 163–184.
Thelen, Kathleen, 1999: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In: American Review of 
Political Science 2, 369–404.
Valenzuela, Samuel J., 1991: Labor Movements and Political Systems: A Conceptual and Typological 
Analysis. Working Paper 167. Indiana: The University of Notre Dame, Hellen Kellog Institute 
for International Studies. 
Vanberg, Viktor J., 2002: Rational Choice vs. Program-Based Behavior: Alternative Theoretical Ap-
proaches and Their Relevance for the Study of Institutions. In: Rationality and Society 14, 7–
54.
Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 06/4
H. Döring
The Composition of the 
College of Commissioners: 
Patterns of Delegation
DP 06/3
S. Burkhart, P. Manow
Veto-Antizipation: 
Gesetzgebung im deutschen 
Bikameralismus
DP 06 / 2
G. Jackson, R. Deeg
How Many Varieties of 
Capitalism? Comparing the 
Comparative Institutional 
Analyses of Capitalist Diversity
DP 06 / 1
N. Bandelj
Cultural Understandings of 
Economic Globalization:
Discourse on Foreign Direct 
Investment in Slovenia
DP 05 / 14
R. Mayntz
Embedded Theorizing:
Perspectives on Globalization 
and Global Governance
DP 05 / 13
G. Möllering
Understanding Trust from the 
Perspective of Sociological 
Neoinstitutionalism:
The Interplay of Institutions 
and Agency
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 06/4
Jens Beckert
Sind Unternehmen sozial 
verantwortlich?
WP 06/3
A. Broscheid, D. Coen
Lobbying Systems in 
the European Union: A 
Quantitative Study
WP 06 / 2
F. W. Scharpf
Nicht genutzte Chancen der 
Föderalismusreform
WP 06 / 1
S. Ganghof
The Politics of Tax Structure
WP 05 / 10
M. Höpner
Politisch-institutionelle 
Determinanten 
aktionärsorientierter Reformen
WP 05 / 9
Aurora Trif
Collective Bargaining Practices 
in Eastern Europe: Case Study 
Evidence from Romania
WP 05 / 8
F. W. Scharpf
No Exit from the Joint Decision 
Trap? Can German Federalism 
Reform Itself?
WP 05 / 7
A. Trif, K. Koch
Strategic Unionism in Eastern 
Europe: The Case of Romania
MPIfG Books
G. Möllering
Trust: Reason, Routine, 
Refl exivity
Elsevier, 2006
W. Streeck, J. Grote, 
V. Schneider, J. Visser (eds.)
Governing Interests:
Business Associations Facing 
Internationalization
Routledge, 2006
J. Beckert, M. Zafi rovski (eds.)
International Encyclopedia of 
Economic Sociology
Routledge, 2005
M. Schludi
The Reform of Bismarckian 
Pension Systems:
A Comparison of Pension 
Politics in Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden
Amsterdam University Press, 
2005
A. Schäfer
Die neue Unverbindlichkeit:
Wirtschaftspolitische 
Koordinierung in Europa
Campus, 2005
G. Falkner, O. Treib, 
M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber
Complying with Europe: 
EU Harmonisation and Soft 
Law in the Member States
Cambridge University Press, 
2005
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF fi le from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Online at the MPIfG website.
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the fi eld of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
